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1 Introduction
The real options approach has become an increasingly standard framework for the investment
timing decision in corporate finance (see [2]). Although the early literature on real options in-
vestigated the investment decision of amonopolist, recent studies have investigated the problem
of several firms competing in the same $mar\cdot ket$ fronl agame theoretlc approach (see [1] for an
overview). Especially, there are alot of studies such as [4, 6, 19] that analyze the investment
game in duopoly by incorporating equilibrium in atiming game into areal options model. More
recently, some studies have been made on incomplete information between firms (e.g., [8, 14])
and agency conflicts in asingle firm (e.g., [5, 16]).
On the other hand, one of the most important problems in corporate finance is to derive
optimal capital structure. Theory of optimal capital structure by the trade-off between tax
advantages and default costs was proposed by [12] in $1950s$ , and hae still developed by many
literatures such as $[9, 3]$ . Capital $stl\cdot ucture$ and finance naturally have adeep connection with
studies on the investment timing decision, though not lnally real options literatures focus on
these matters. $Rema\iota\cdot kable$ studles in thi8 area $weI^{\cdot}e$ condncted by Matlel$\cdot$ and $s_{a1}\cdot kar[10]$ and
Sundaresan and Wang $[18, 17]$ . They investigated a $fi_{1}\cdot m\backslash \prime aJut$), investient timing, debt financ-
lng, and erldogenous bankruptcy simultaneously in amodel $whel\cdot e$ a $fi_{1}\cdot m$ makes areal investment
along with issuing debt.
However, existing literatures [10, 18, 17] consider only the monopolistic situation and inves-
tigate $m$ competitive situation of several flrms. In this paper, we extend the analysis by [18]
to the case where several firms try to preempt amarket. To put in more concretely, we derive
the equilibrium investment strategies in the $timi_{Il}g$ game (cf. [4, 6, 19]) under the competition
between among firms that can issue debt at the investment. By this, we $Clar1\mathfrak{h}^{r}$ the effects of
the competition upon the firm value, investment timing, debt financing, and default timing. In
order to analytically derive equilibrium, we consider asimple situation whele more than one
firm is not allowed to receive aprofit flow from the market simultaneously2.
We reveal the $eIrects$ of debt fillancing in strategic $invet^{1}tment$ , by deriving equilibrium in
the following three types of duopoly:
(i) Colnpetltion between two sylnnletric firms. Both firms can issue debt. This may be inter-
preted as that each firm has its own lender.
(ii) Competition between two sylnlnetric firms. Only one (called leader) that make an invest-
ment prior can issue debt, while the other (called follower) cannot isvue debt. This may be
interpreted as that there is only one lender for the investment $p\iota\cdot oject$ .
(iii) Cornpetition between two $as_{J^{r}}mmetric$ firlns. $O\iota ue$ can issue debt, while the other is unlev-
ered for exogenous $1^{\cdot}eas^{\neg}onf$ ’sllch as $sl\iota ortage$ of credit.
1This paper is an abbreviated version. All proofs, remarks and some $t^{\backslash }.(1^{\backslash }npnt|.t.ional$ results are omitted due to
the page restriction.
2This assumption ls essentially the same as that of $[8, 19]$
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Note that, in the preemptive equilibrium under the competition between unlevered firms
the investment is hastened at the zero NPV (Net Present Value) point (i.e., when the NPV of
the investment is $0$ ). In contrast, we show that, in equilibrium in Duopoly (i), (ii), and (iii),
investment is hastened but later than the zero-NPV point and the firm value is positive. This
results from a possibility of leader’s bankruptcy. Coupon of debt which the leader issue becomes
smaller than that of monopolist, while firms’ leverage and credit spread are unchanged from
those of a monopolist.
In particular, we show that in (iii) the levered firm always wins the race. That is, the levered
firm invest with debt financing prior to the unlevered one and obtain much bigger profit than
the unlevered one. We observe that the inequality (ii) $<(i)<$ (iii) holds with respect to both
the investment time and the value of the the levered firm.
In addition, we derive the equilIbrium strategies in the competitive situation of $n$ symmetric
levered firms. As the number of the firms $n$ becomes larger, the investment take places earlier
and the coupon and the firm value become smaller. On letting $narrow+\infty$ the investment timing
is hastened to the zero-NPV point as well as the firm value decreases to $0$ . Furthermore, we
investigate the social loss due to the preemptive competition among firms by comparing the
outcome in the preemptive equilibrium with that of the leader-follower game. We show that,
the lager the number of firms, $n$ , the greater the social loss.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces, as a bench mark, the firm
values and the investment strategies of unlevered and levered monopolists. In Section 3 we
derive the firm value and the investment strategy in equilibrium in the three types of duopoly
(i), (ii), and (iii). In Section 4 we derive the equilibrium in oligopoly and then investigate the
loss due to the preemptive competition among firms. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Monopoly
2.1 Unlevered flrm
First, let us explain the setup. This paper follows the one growth option model of $[$ 18$]^{}$ Assume
that the firm are risk-neutral and behaves in the interests of equityholders. 4 The flrm with no
initial assets has an option to enter a new market. The firm can choose the investment time,
observing the market demand $X(t)$ at time $t$ . The firm collects a profit flow $QX(t)$ by paying a
sunk cost $I$ , where $Q(>0)$ and $I(>0)$ are constants. We assume that the firm faces a constant
tax rate $\tau\in(0,1)$ . For simplicity, we assume that $X(t)$ obeys the following geometric Brownian
motion:
$dX(t)=\mu X(t)dt+\sigma X(t)dB(t),$ $X(O)=x(>0)$ ,
where, $\mu$ and $\sigma(>0)$ are constants, $B(t)$ represents the one-dimensional standard Brownian
motion. The initial value $X(O)=x$ is a sufficiently small constant so that the firm has to wait
for its exercise condition to be met.
Now, we consider the unlevered firm under all-equity financing. The unlevered firm deter-
mines its investment time $T$ by solving the following optimal stopping time problem:
$V_{ae}(x)= \sup_{T\in \mathcal{T}}E[\int_{T}^{+\infty}e^{-rt}(1-\tau)QX(t)dt-e^{-rT}I]$ , (1)
3Literature [18] consider the firm with two sequentially ordered growth options in order to investigate debt
overhang.
4Throughout the paper, we use the terminology “equityholders”, following [18]. We do not distinguish equity-
holders and entrepreneur in the model. Hence, in the remainder of the paper, we can replace equityholders and
equity value as entrepreneur and entrepreneur’s value, respectively. To put it another way, we may consider that
the entrepreneur does not issue equity but has money necessarv for the investment project.
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where, $\mathcal{T}$ is a set of all $\mathcal{F}_{t}$ stopping times ( $\mathcal{F}_{t}$ is the usual filtration generated by $B(t)$ ), and $r$
denotes the risk-free interest rat$e$ satisfying $r>\mu$ . Problem (1) is reduced to
$V_{ae}(x)= \sup_{T\in \mathcal{T}}E[e^{-rT}(\Pi(X(T))-I)]$ ,
where the function $\Pi(X(T))$ is defined by
$\Pi(X(T))=\frac{1-\tau}{r-\mu}QX(T)$ . (2)
Then the optimal investment time $T_{ae}^{1}$ and the firm value $V_{ae}(x)$ are easily calculated as
$\dot{p}_{ae}=\inf\{t>0|X(t)\geq x_{ae}^{i}\}$ , (3)
and
$V_{ae}(x)=( \frac{x}{x_{ae}^{i}})^{\beta}(\Pi(x_{ae}^{i})-I)$ . (4)
(see, for example, [2, 11]). Here, $\beta$ is a positive characteristic root defined by
$\beta=\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\mu}{\sigma^{2}}+\sqrt{(\frac{\mu}{\sigma^{2}}-\frac{1}{2})^{2}+\frac{2r}{\sigma^{2}}}(>1)$.
and the investment trigger $x_{ae}^{i}$ is
$x_{ae}^{i}= \frac{\beta}{\beta-1}\frac{I}{\Pi(1)}$ . (5)
As well known, the investment trigger $x_{ae}^{i}$ is larger than the zero-NPV trigger $x_{NPV}=I/\Pi(1)$ .
2.2 Levered firm
This subsection summarizes the results in the one growth option case of [18]. Consider the
levered firm that can issue debt with infinite maturity at the investment. In a usual manner,
we solve the problem backward.
Assume that the firm has already invested at time $s$ with market demand $X(s)$ along with
issuing debt with coupon $c$ . The equityholders (entrepreneur) have incentives to default after
debt is in place. They choose the default time $T^{d}$ to maximize the equity value as follows:
$E(X(s), c)$
$=T \in \mathcal{T}\sup_{T\geq s}E[l^{T}e^{-r(t-s)}(1-\tau)(QX(t)-c)dt|\mathcal{F}_{s}]$ . (6)
The optimal default time $T_{d}$ is
$T^{d}= \inf\{t\geq s|X(t)\leq x^{d}(c)\}$ ,
where the default trigger $x^{d}(c)$ is a function of $c$ given by
$x^{d}(c)= \frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}\frac{r-\mu}{r}\frac{c}{Q}$ . (7)
Here $\gamma$ denotes a negative characteristic root defined by
$\gamma=\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\mu}{\sigma^{2}}-\sqrt{(\frac{\mu}{\sigma^{2}}-\frac{1}{2})^{2}+\frac{2r}{\sigma^{2}}}(<0)$ .
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Then, at time $s$ the equity value $E(X(s), c)$ , the debt value $D(X(s), c)$ , and the firm value
$V(X(s), c)=E(X(s), c)+D(X(s), c)$ are expressed as
$E(X(s), c)= \Pi(X(s))-\frac{(1-\tau)c}{r}-(\Pi(x^{d}(c))-\frac{(1-\tau)c}{r})(\frac{X(s)}{x^{d}(c)})^{\gamma}$ (8)
$D(X(s), c)$ $=$ $E[\int_{s}^{T^{d}}e^{-r(t-s)}cdt+e^{-r(T^{d}-s)}(1-\alpha)\Pi(X(T^{d}))|\mathcal{F}_{s}]$ (9)
$\frac{c}{r}-(\frac{c}{r}-(1-\alpha)\Pi(x^{d}(c)))(\frac{X(s)}{x^{d}(c)})^{\gamma}$ (10)
$V(X(s), c)= \Pi(X(s))+\frac{\tau c}{r}-(\alpha\Pi(x^{d}(c))+\frac{\tau c}{r})(\frac{\dot{X}(s)}{x^{d}(c)})^{\gamma}$ (11)
for $X(s)\geq x^{d}(c)$ , where $\alpha(\geq 0)$ is a given constant representing the default cost. Note that
debtholders collects the $e$ntire default value, i.e., $(1-\alpha)\Pi(x^{d}(c))$ .
The equityholders (entrepreneur) choose the investment trigger $T^{i}$ and coupon $c(X(T^{i}))$ to
maximize the firm value (11). That is, the problem becomes the following:
$V_{de}(x)=$ $\sup$ $E[e^{-rT}(V(X(T), c)-I)]$ . (12)
$T\in \mathcal{T}$
$c(\geq 0):F_{T}$ -measurable
Problem (12) can be interpreted as follows. Assume that debtholders lend $K$ for the debt. Then,
the equityholders’ (entrepreneur’s) value at the investment time $T$ is
$E(X(T), c)+K-I$ , (13)
while the debtholders’ value at $T$ becomes
$D(X(T), c)-K$. (14)
Since the sum of (13) and (14) is equal to $V(X(T), c)-I$ , the solution of problem (12) is
optimal for both the equityholders and the debtholders. The price $K$ determines the asset
allocation between equityholders and debtholders, but throughout the paper we do not consider
the allocation problem. 5
Note that arg $\max_{c\geq 0}V(X(s), c)$ becomes
$c(X(s))= \frac{r}{r-\mu}\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\frac{QX(s)}{h}(>0)$ , (15)
for $X(s)>0$ . Here, $h$ is a constant given by
$h=[1- \gamma(1-\alpha+\frac{\alpha}{\tau})]^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}>1$ .
Then, by some calculation we can show
$V(X(s), c(X(s)))=\psi^{-1}\Pi(X(s))$ , (16)
5In [10] agency conflicts between equityholders and debtholders occurs at the investment time because the
price $K$ is fixed Prior to investment. In contrast, such conflicts do not arise in [18] and this paper because the
price $K$ is adjusted by the negotiation at investment timing. The difference betwee$n$ problem (12) and “ first best”
scenario in [10] is whether the coupon $c$ is controllable.
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where the function $\Pi(\cdot)$ is defined by (2) and $\psi$ is a constant given by
$\psi=[1+\frac{\tau}{(1-\tau)h}]^{-1}<1$ .
As a result, problem (12) can be rewritten as
$V_{de}(x)= \sup_{T\in \mathcal{T}}E[e^{-rT}(\psi^{-1}\Pi(X(s))-I)]$ .
Thus, the optimal investment time of (12) is
$T^{i}= \inf\{t>0|X(t)\geq x^{i}\}$ ,
and the optimal coupon is $c(x^{i})$ , where the investment trigger $x^{i}$ is defined by
$x^{i}=\psi x_{ae}^{i}<x_{ae}^{i}$ . (17)
Recall that $x_{ae}^{i}$ is defined by (5). From (7) and (15), we have default trigger
$x^{d}(c(x^{i}))= \frac{x^{i}}{h}$ .
The firm value $V_{de}(x)$ at initial time becomes
$V_{de}(x)=( \frac{x}{x^{i}})^{\beta}(\psi^{-1}\Pi(x^{i})-I)>V_{a}$ $(x)$ . (18)
The investment trigger $x^{i}$ of the levered firm lies between the levered firm’s zero-NPV trigger
$\psi_{X_{NPV}}$ and that of the unlevered one, $x_{ae}^{i}$ . Note that the unlevered flrm’s problem (1) corre-
sponds to (12) with $c=0$ . Naturally, the levered firm value (18) is larger than the unlevered






$=$ $r \frac{\xi}{1-\xi}$ , (20)
respectively, where $\xi$ is defined by
$\xi=(1-(1-\alpha)(1-\tau)\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1})h^{\gamma}$ .
Note that $0<\xi<1$ and that both (19) and (20) do not depend on the investment trigger $x^{i}$ .




This section considers competition between two firms with complete information to focus on
strategic investment with debt financing. Assume that each firm receives a cash flow $Q_{2}X(t)$
when both firms exist in the market. In order to show the essence of the preemptive activities of
firms, Section 3.1-3.3 assume $Q_{2}=0$ as in $[8, 19]$ . This means that the market is small enough
to be filled with a single firm that entries first. After Section 3.1 describes the bench mark case:
competition between unlevered firms, Section 3.2 and 3.3 investigate situation of two symmetric
firms that can issue debt, and situation of two asymmetric firms, that is, a levered firm vs. an
unlevered firm. Section 3.4 makes a brief comment on a general case of $Q_{2}\in(0, Q)$ (negative
externalities), though we cannnot make the analytical derivation.
3.1 $Compet\ddagger tion$ between unlevered firms
This subsection provides the well known outcome under competition between two unlevered
firms (see, for example, [6]). Let $L_{ae}(X(s))$ and $F_{ae}(X(s))$ denote the expected discounted
value (at time s) of a firm (called leader) that entries the market first at state $X(s)$ and that of
the other (called follower) that responds optimally to the leader. It follows from $Q_{2}=0$ that
the follower has no oPportunity for investment. Accordingly, the follower’s and leader’s value
become $F_{ae}(X(s))=0$ and $L_{ae}(X(s))=\Pi(X(s))-I$ , respectively. In the situation where neither
firms has invested, each firm tries to invest earlier than $e$ach other to obtain the leader’s payoff
$L_{ae}(X(s))$ when the leader’s payoff $L_{ae}(X(s))$ Is larger than the follower’s payoff $F_{ae}(X(s))$ . By
the preemption, in equilibrium each firm try to invest at the zero-NPV point $X(s)=X_{NPV}$ , 6
which is the solution of $\Pi(X(s))-I=0$ , and as a consequence each firm value becomes zero.
There are no equilibrium other than the above one (called preemptlve equilibrium). Note that
the outcome remains unchanged in the setting where $n$ unlevered firms compete.
3.2 Competition between two symmetric firms
This sectlon considers two types of competition between two symmetric firms with debt financ-
ing. First we consider Duopoly (i) in which the firms, whether invest first or not, can issue
debt.
As usual, we begin by one of the firms (called leader) llas already invested at state $X(s)$ .
The leader’s firm value, denoted $L_{de}(X(s))$ , is $L_{de}(X(s))=\psi^{-1}\Pi(X(s))-I$ because from the
point $s$ the leader can obtain a monopolist’s cash flow $QX(t)$ and choose monopolist’s default
strategy owing to $Q_{2}=0$ . Recall that the leader investing at $X(s)$ chooses the optimal coupon
(15) and obtaims the firm value (16).
On the other hand, the other’s (called follower) firm value, denoted $F_{de}(X(s))$ , are calculated
as follows:
$F_{de}(X(s))$ $=$ $( \frac{X(s)}{x^{d}(c(X(s)))})^{\gamma}V_{de}(x^{d}(c(X(s))))$
$\{\begin{array}{ll}h^{\gamma-\beta}(\frac{X(s)}{x^{i}})^{\beta}(\psi^{-1}\Pi(x^{\dot{\iota}})-I) (0<X(s)<hx^{i})h^{\gamma}[\psi^{-1}\Pi(\frac{X(s)}{h})-I] (X(s) \geq hx^{i}).\end{array}$ (1)
Eq. (1) is the value of option to invest after the leader’s bankruptcy. Note that the follower
chooses the same investment trigger (of course, not the same time), coupon, and default trigger
$\overline{6Following[4,19],}$this paper assume that one of the firms is chosen as a leader when the flrms try to invest
at the same threshold. For details of the timing game, see APpendix A.
211
as those of the monopolist, i.e., $x^{i},$ $c(x^{i})$ , and $x^{d}(c(x^{i}))$ . Unlike $F_{ae}(X(s))=0$ in Section
3.1, $F_{de}(X(s))>0$ holds for all $X(s)>0$ . As mentioned in problem (12), the equityholders
(entrepreneur) of each firm choose the investment time and coupon to maximize the firm value.
Accordingly, the firms attempts to preempt each other when the leader’s incentive is positive,
i.e., $L_{de}(X(s))>F_{de}(X(s))$ . We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exist a unique $x_{P}$ satisfying $L_{de}(x_{P})=F_{de}(x_{P})$ in the interval $(\psi x_{NPV}, x^{i})$ .
In Duopoly (i) there occurs only the following preemptive equilibrium. Each firm try to invest
at
$T_{L}^{i}= \inf\{t>0|X(t)\geq x_{P}\}$
and one of the firms executes the investment as a leader at the time $T_{L}^{i}$ along with issuing debt
with coupon $c(x_{P})$ . Then the leader defaults at
$T_{L}^{d}= \inf\{t>T_{L}^{i}|X(t)\leq x_{P}/h\}$ .
After the leader’s bankruptcy, the other, as a follower, invest at
$T_{F}^{i}= \inf\{t>T_{L}^{d}|X(t)\geq x^{i}\}$
along with issuing debt with coupon $c(x^{i})$ , and then defaults
$T_{F}^{d}= \inf\{t>\dot{T}_{F}|X(t)\leq x^{i}/h\}$ .
The firm value at initial time becomes
$h^{\gamma-\beta}V_{de}(x)$ . (2)
The preemptive trigger $x_{P}$ may be smaller than the unlevered firm’s zero NPV point $X_{NPV}$ ,
though of course it is larger than that of the levered case, $\psi x_{NPV}$ . For many practical parameter
values we observe $x_{P}<X_{NPV}$ . Proposition 1 shows that the leader has smaller investment
trigger, coupon, and default trigger, i.e., $x_{P}<x^{i},$ $c(x_{P})<c(x^{i})$ and, $x^{d}(c(x_{P}))=x_{P}/h<$
$x^{d}(c(x^{i}))=x^{i}/h$ than those of the monopolist (or follower). Each firm’s leverage and credit
spared at the investment time remain unchanged from those of the monopolist, i.e., (19) and
(20), respectively. This is because the even with fear of preemption by the rival the firm can
optimize capital structure. The firm value (2) is $h^{\gamma-\beta}(<1)$ times of the levered monopolist
value (18) due to the preemptive competition.
A firm’s endogenous default decision generates a positive firm value in spite of the assumption
$Q_{2}=0$ . This feature is contrasted with other previous results. In $[19, 15]$ a leader does not
always obtain a profit from the market because it takes a random development term from
the investment until the completion of the project. The random development term generates
a positive value under the competition. In [8] incomplete information about the rival firm’s
strategy plays a role in generating a positive value under the competition.
Next, let us turn to Duopoly (ii) where only the leader can issue debt. This may be inter-
preted as that only one lender exists for the investment project. The firm value of the leader who
invests at $X(s)$ does not change from $L_{de}(X(s))$ . On the other hand, the firm value, denot$ed$
$F_{ae}^{de}$ , of the follower who takes the optimal response becomes the following:
$F_{ae}^{\ }(X(s))$ $=$ $( \frac{X(s)}{x^{d}(c(X(s)))})^{\gamma}V_{ae}(x^{d}(c(X(s))))$
$\{\begin{array}{ll}h^{\gamma-\beta}(\frac{X(s)}{x_{ae}^{i}})^{\beta}(\Pi(x_{ae}^{i})-I) (0<X(s)<hx_{ae}^{i})h^{\gamma}(\Pi(x_{ae}^{i})-I) (X (s)\geq hx_{a}^{i} ).\end{array}$ (3)
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The firms attempt to preempt each other for $X(t)$ satisfying $L_{de}(X(t))>F_{ae}^{de}(X(t))$ . $7$ We
obtain the following proposition in Duopoly (ii).
Proposition 2 There exists a unique solution of $L_{de}(x_{P}^{\wedge})=F_{ae}^{de}(X_{P}^{\wedge})$ in the interval $(\psi x_{NPV}, x^{i})$ .
In Duopoly (ii) there occurs only the following preemptive equilibrium. Each firm try to invest
at
$\hat{T}_{L}^{i}=\inf\{t>0|X(t)\geq x_{\hat{P}}\}$
and one of the firms executes the investment as a leader at the time $\hat{T}_{L}^{i}$ along with issuIng debt
with coupon $c(x_{\hat{P}})$ . Then the leader defaults at
$\hat{T}_{L}^{d}=\inf\{t>\hat{T}_{L}^{i}|X(t)\leq x_{\hat{P}}/h\}$ .
After the leader’s bankruptcy, the other, as a follower, invest at
$\hat{\dot{P}}_{F}=\inf\{t>\hat{T}_{L}^{d}|X(t)\geq x_{ae}^{i}\}$
without debt. The firm value at initial time becomes
$h^{\gamma-\beta}V_{ae}(x)$ . (4)
It can be easily checked that $F_{ae}^{de}(X(s))<F_{de}(X(s))$ for $X(s)>0$ . This implies that
the leader has smaller investment trigger, coupon, and default trigger than those of the leader
in Duopoly (i), i.e., $x_{P}^{\wedge}<x_{P},$ $c(x_{\hat{P}})<c(x_{P})$ , and $x^{d}(c(x_{P}^{\wedge}))=X^{\wedge}p/h<x^{d}(c(x_{P}))=x_{P}/h$.
The firms’ leverage and credit spread are the same as (19) and (20) in monopoly. The firm
value (4) is $V_{de}(x)/V_{ae}(x)(<1)$ times of (2) in Duopoly (i). Compared with Duopoly (i), more
severe preemptive competition occurs in Duopoly (ii) since the leader enjoys not only the market
advantage but also the advantage of capital structure.
3.3 Competition between a levered firm and an unlevered firm
This subsection considers Duopoly (iii): a levered firm vs. an unlevered firm that is not allowed
to issue debt for exogenous reasons such as shortage of credit. The firm value of the levered firm
that invests as a leader at $X(s)$ agrees with $L_{de}(X(s))$ , while the firm value of the unlevered
firm that responds optimally as a follower is equal to $F_{ae}^{de}(X(s))$ given by (3). Conversely, the
firm value of the unlevered firm that invests as a leader at $X(s)$ becomes $L_{ae}(X(s))$ , while the
firm value of the levered firm acting as a follower is $F_{ae}(X(s))=0.8$
The levered firm has an incentive to preempt the unlevered one for $X(s)$ satisfying $L_{de}(X(s))>$
$0$ , i.e., $X(s)>\psi x_{NPV}$ . On the other hand, the unlevered firm tries to become the leader for $X(s)$
satisfying $L_{ae}(X(s))>F_{ae}^{de}(X(s))$ . Taking this into account, we have the following proposition
in Duopoly (iii).
Proposition 3 There exists a unique solution $X\tilde{p}$ of $L_{ae}(x_{P}^{\sim})=F_{ae}^{de}(x_{P}^{\sim})$ in the interval $(x_{NPV}, x_{ae}^{i})$ .
The outcome in Duopoly (iii) is classified into the following two cases.
(a) $x_{P}^{\sim}<x^{i}$
Only the following preemption equilibrium occurs. The levered firm invest at
$\underline{T_{L}^{i}=}\inf\{t>0|X(t)\geq x_{P}^{\sim}\}$
7This paper considers the model where the equityholders (entrepreneur) tries to maximize the firm value as
mentioned in problem (12). This paper does not consider the debtholders’ optimal strategy. As will be noted as
in Section 6, it is $an$ important future work to analyze how the allocation between equityholders and debtholders
changes by the competition among the entrepreneurs.
8As shown in Proposition 3, in equilibrium, the levered firm always become a leader, and therefore the order
is never realized.
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along with issuing debt of coupon $c(x_{\tilde{P}})$ , and then defaults
$T_{L}^{d}-= \inf\{t>\tilde{T}_{L}^{i}|X(t)\leq x_{P}^{\sim}/h\}$ .
After the levered firm’s bankruptcy the unlevered firm invests at
$T_{Fa}^{\tilde{i}}=1nf\{t>T_{L}^{d}|X(t)\geq x_{ae}^{i}\}$ .
The levered firm value at initial time is equal to
$( \frac{x}{x_{\tilde{P}}})^{\beta}(V(x_{P}^{\sim}, c(x_{P}^{-}))-I)$ . (5)
The unlevered firm value agrees with (4).
(b) $x_{P}^{-}\geq x^{i}$
Only the following equilibrium (called dominant leader type) occurs. The levered firm invest at
$T^{i}= \inf\{t>0|X(t)\geq x^{i}\}$
along with issuing debt of coupon $c(x^{i})$ , and then defaults
$T^{d}= \inf\{t>T^{i}|X(t)\leq x^{i}/h\}$ .
After the levered firm’s bankruptcy the unlevered firm invests at
$T_{Fb}^{\tilde{i}}= \inf\{t>T^{d}|X(t)\geq x_{ae}^{i}\}$ .
The levered firm value at initial time is the same as that of the monopolist, $V_{de}(x)$ , given by
(18). The unlevered firm value at initial time is (4).
As explained in $[6, 7]$ , there may arise three types of equilibrium, namely preemption, dom-
inant type, and joint investment. In (a) in Proposition 3 the preemption equilibrium occurs,
while the dominant leader type equilibrium occurs in (b). In both cases, the levered firm that
enjoys optimal capital structure becomes the leader. The result is realistically intuitive. For
quite a large $\tau$ , which leads a small $x^{i}$ , condition (b) is satisfied. In (b) the levered firm is
dominant owing to the great tax advantage over the unlevered one.
Let us take a look at the investment strategies in Proposition 3. Note that the unlevered
flrm’s investment trigger is the same as that of the unlevered $mo$nopolist. With respect to the
levered firm’s strategy in (a), we can show inequalitles $x_{\hat{P}}<x_{P}^{\sim}<x^{i},$ $c(x_{\hat{P}})<c(x_{\tilde{P}})<c(x^{i})$ , and
$x^{d}(c(x_{P}^{\wedge}))=x_{P}^{\wedge}/h<x^{d}(c(x_{P}^{\sim}))=x_{P}^{\sim}/h<x^{d}(c(x^{i}))=x^{i}/h$ . As in the previous propositions,
the firm’s leverage and credit spread at the investment time are unchanged from (19) and (20) of
the monopolist. Note that the trigger $x_{P}^{\sim}$ , unlike $x_{P}$ , always is larger than the unlevered firm’s
zero NPV trigger $x_{NPV}$ . Thc incquality $x_{P}^{\sim}>x_{P}$ holds for most parameter values, though it
can not be theoretically proved. In (b), the levered firm can take the best strategy. i.e., the
monopolist’ strategy because of the strong tax effect.
We now consider the firm value in Proposition 3. In both cases, the unlevered firm must
wait for the leader’s bankruptcy. Due to the waiting time the unlevered firm value (4) becomes
$h^{\gamma-\beta}(<1)$ times of the monopolist’s value. Note that in the unlevered firm value is the same
in both cases in spite of $T_{Fa}^{\tilde{i}}\neq T_{Fb}^{\tilde{i}}$ . The levered firm value in (a) is also reduced from that of
monopoly due to the suboptimal investment timing. By $x_{\tilde{P}}>x_{P}>X_{P}^{\wedge}$ , the levered firm value
(5) becomes larger than (4) and (2) in Duopoly (i) and (ii). Not to mention, the levered firm
value in (b) agrees with that of the monopolist because it can take the optimal strategy. To
sum up, the fact that the rival changes from levered to unlevered means a decline in the rival’s
competition power and therefore it increases the levered firm value. Note that in both cases the
levered firm value exceeds (4) of the unlevered one.
214
3.4 Case of $Q_{2}>0$
This subsection makes a brief explanation about the results in the general case such that $0<$
$Q_{2}<Q$ , although the setting does not allow us to show clear results. As a bench mark, we
consider the competition between two unlevered firms. By $Q_{2}>0$ the follower can entry the
market where the leader survives when the market demand $X(s)$ is sufficiently great. The
leader’s profit is reduced from $QX(t)$ to $Q_{2}X(t)$ after the follower’s entry. Since the leader’s
incentive is smaller than that in the case of $Q_{2}=0$ , the preemption trigger becomes larger than
the zero-NPV trigger $x_{NPV}$ in Section 3.1, which generates a positive firm value in equilibrium.
We now consider Duopoly (i) –(iii). In every case, the follower may invest for large $X(s)$
prior to the leader’s default. Note that the follower in (ii) and (iii) never defaults. The fact
changes the leader’s default trigger in the market where both are active from $x^{d}(c)$ to $x^{d}(c)Q/Q_{2}$ .
Thus, in (ii) and (iii) both the equity and debt values of the leader are reduc$ed$ from (8) and
(10). Expecting the possibility of the follower’s interception, the leader issues debt with smaller
coupon than $c(X(s))$ . On the other hand, because of the decrease in the leader’s value and the
increase in the follower’s value the preemption triggers, denoted $x_{P’}^{\wedge}$ and $x_{\tilde{P}’}$ in (ii) and (iii),
become larger than $x_{\hat{P}}$ and $x_{\tilde{P}}$ , respectively. By the trade-off between these two effects, it is
ambiguous whether the leader’s coupon in the investment time in (ii) and (iii) are smaller than
$c(x_{P}^{\wedge})$ and $c(x^{\sim}p)$ . The leverage and credit spread may also change from those of the monopolist.
In Duopoly (i), the analysis is more complicated. The follower can choose its coupon taking
account of the outcome of the exit timing game discussed in [13], when it enters the market
where the leader survives. The follower is likely to choose smaller coupon than that of the
leader so that it can win the exit timing game (i.e., it can collect a monopolistic profit flow
$QX(t)$ after the leader’s bankruptcy). In this case, the leader’s default trigger change from
$x^{d}(c)$ to $x^{d}(c)Q/Q_{2}$ , which implies the similar outcome to those of (ii) and (iii). The inequality
$x_{\hat{P}’}<x_{P}’,$ $x_{\tilde{P}’}$ is unchanged, where $x_{P}’$ denotes the preemption trigger in (ii) with $Q_{2}\in(0, Q)$ .
4 Oligopoly
4.1 Competition among $n$ levered firms
Throughout this section, we assume that the market is small enough to be filled with a single
firm, i.e., $Q_{2}=0$ . In this section we generalize Duopoly (i) to the situation of $n$ firms that can
issue debt. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Under the competition among $n$ firms, only the following preemptive equilib-
rium occurs.
Each firm tries to invest at
$\dot{T}_{\langle n)}=\inf\{t>0|X(t)\geq x_{(n)}^{i}\}$
and one of the firms (denoted Firm n) executes the investment at the time 9 along with issuing
debt with coupon $c(x_{(n)}^{i})$ . Then the firm defaults at
$T_{(n)}^{d}= \inf\{t>\dot{\Gamma}_{(n)}|X(t)\leq x_{(n)}^{i}/h\}$ .
After the Firm $n’ s$ default, the remainders ($n-1$ firms) try to invest at
$\tau_{(n-1)}^{i}=\inf\{t>\tau_{(n)}^{d}|X(t)\geq x_{(n-1)}^{i}\}$
9As in Proposition 1, we assume that one of the firms is chosen at fair probability, i.e., $1/n$ .
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and one of the firms (denoted Firm $n-1$ ) executes the investment at the time along with issuing
debt with coupon $c(x_{(n-1)}^{i})$ . Then the firm defaults at
$\tau_{(n-1)}^{d}=\inf\{t>\tau_{(n-1)}^{i}|X(t)\leq x_{(n-1)}^{i}/h\}$ .
:
After Firm 2’ default, the last firm (denoted Firm 1) invest at
$\tau_{(1)}^{i}=\inf\{t>\tau_{(2)}^{d}|X(t)\geq x_{(1)}^{i}\}$
along with issuing debt with coupon $c(x_{(1)}^{i})$ , and then defaults at
$T_{(1)}^{d}= \inf\{t>\tau_{(1)}^{i}|X(t)\leq x_{(1)}^{i}/h\}$ .
Here the investment trigger $x_{(k)}^{i}$ of Firm $k$ is defined by the unique solution of
$\psi^{-1}\Pi(x_{(k)}^{i})-I=h^{(k-1)(\gamma-\beta)}(\frac{x_{(k)}^{i}}{x^{i}})^{\beta}(\psi^{-1}\Pi(x^{i})-I)$ $(\psi x_{NPV}<x_{(k)}^{i}\leq x^{i})$ . (1)
The investment triggers $x_{(k)}^{i}$ satisfy
$\psi x_{NPV}<x_{(n)}^{i}<x_{(n-1)}^{i}<\ldots<x_{(2)}^{i}=x_{P}<x_{(1)}^{i}=x^{i}$. (2)
In equilibrium the firm value is equal to
$h^{(n-1)(\gamma-\beta)}V_{de}(x)$ . (3)
As $narrow+\infty$ , the firm value (3) and the preemption trigger $x_{(n)}^{i}$ converges to $0$ and $\psi x_{NPV}$ ,
respectively.





The firm value (3) is $h^{(\gamma-\beta)(n-1)}(<1)$ times of the monopolist value $V_{de}(x)$ . The firm value
monotonically decreases to $0$ as the number of the firm, $n$ , increas$e$ . This can be interpreted
that a positive excess profit that arises in oligopoly (finite n) vanishes in the competitive market
(infinite $n$). In the competitive market where infinite firms compete, every firm attempts to
invest at the $ze$ro-NPV trigger $\psi x_{NPV}$ . Our results in the limiting case are similar to the results
obtained in the model by [8].
4.2 Social loss due to preemption
This subsection focuses on the social loss due to the preemptive competition among firms.
First we consider the outcome of the leader-follower game, in which the order of the firms is
exogenously given in advance. Without fear of preemption by the others, every firm chooses the
monopolist’s strategy, i.e., investment trigger $x^{i}$ , coupon $c(x^{i})$ , and default trigger $x^{d}(c(x^{i}))=$
$x^{i}/h$ (see Table 2). The firm value of Firm $k$ , which invests after $n-k$ firms’ defaults, is
$h^{(r.-k)(\gamma-\beta)}\ddagger^{r_{de}}(x)$ (4)
By comparing Table 1 with Table 2, we can see inefficiency caused by preemption. From
Table 1 and 2, we see that the value of Firm 1, which is given the worst role in the leader-follower
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game, agrees with the value of all firms in the preemptive equilibrium. The total sum of values
of $n$ firms is
$nh^{(\gamma-\beta)(n-1)}V_{de}(x)\downarrow 0$ $(narrow+\infty)$ (5)
in the preemptive equilibrium, while the sum in the leader-follower game is
$\sum_{k=1}^{n}h^{(\gamma-\beta)(k-1)}V_{de}(x)=\frac{1-h^{(\gamma-\beta)n}}{1-h^{\gamma-\beta}}V_{de}(x)\uparrow\frac{V_{de}(x)}{1-h^{\gamma-\beta}}$ $(narrow+\infty)$ . (6)
We define the (relative) social loss due to preemption by $n$ firms, denoted Loss$(n)$ , by Loss$(n)=$
$1-(5)/(6)$ . Then we have
Loss $(n)=1- \frac{nh^{(\gamma-\beta)(n-1)}(1-h^{\gamma-\beta})}{1-h^{(\gamma-\beta)n}}\uparrow 1$ $(narrow+\infty)$ . (7)
From (7) we can state that an increase in the number of firms, $n$ , causes the severe preemptive
competition and the inefficient outcome with great social loss.
Table 1: $Pree$mption game.
Table 2: Leader-follower ame.





This paper has investigated strategic investment with debt financing by extending the monop-
olist’s one growth option case in [18] to the case allowing preemptive activities of several firms.
We analyzed three types of duopoly, namely, (i) two symmetric firms that, whether leader or
follower, can issue debt, (ii) two symmetric firms of which only the leader can issue debt, and
(iii) a levered firm vs. an unlevered firm. The main results in duopoly can be summarized as
follows.
Unlike in the competition between unlevered firms, the possibility of the leader’s default gen-
erates a positive excess profit to the firms in equilibrium. In (iii) the levered firm always invests
first and overwhelms the unlevered one. The order of hardness in the preemptive competition
is (ii), (i), (iii).
Moreover, we have derived the equilibrium in oligopoly of $n$ levered firms, and have shown
that the social loss due to preemption increases with the number of firms.
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We provide some interesting issues of future research. Following [18], the model in this
paper does not impose any exogenous restriction between the investment cost $I$ and the amount
$K(<D(X(T), c))$ which the entrepreneur borrows by means of debt financing. In the real world,
a small entrepreneurial firm that cannot issue equity is likely to be imposed a hard restriction
such that a part of $I$ must be financed by debt. In a model with such a restriction we may know
the effects of the competition on the leverage, although analytical discusslon seems difficult.
This paper does not consider the debtholders’ optimal strategy. In a model where debtholders
are regarded as an independent player of the investment game, we may understand how the
competition among several entrepreneurs changes the allocation between the entrepreneurs and
the debtholders.
References
[1] M. Boyer, \’E. Gravel, and P. Lasserre. Real options and strategic competition: a survey.
Working paper, Universit\’e de Montr\’eal, 2004.
[2] A. Dixit and R. Pindyck. Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1994.
[3] R. Goldstein, N. Ju, and H. Leland. An ebit-based model of dynamic capital structure.
Joumal of Business, 74:483-512, 2001.
[4] S. Grenadier. The strategic exercise of options: development cascades and overbuilding in
real estate markets. Joumal of Finance, 51:1653-1679, 1996.
[5] S. Grenadier and N. Wang. Investment timing, agency, and information. $Jo$umal of Finan-
cial Economics, 75:493-533, 2005.
[6] K. Huisman. Technology Investment: A Game Theoretic Real Options Approach. Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Boston, 2001.
[7] J. Kong and Y. Kwok. Real options in strategic investment games between two asymmetric
firms. European Joumal of Operational Research, 29:1405-1428, 2007.
[8] B. Lambrecht and W. Perraudin. Real options and preemption under incomplete informa-
tion. Joumal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 27:619-643, 2003.
[9] H. Leland. Corporate debt value, bond covenants, and optimal capital structure. Joumal
of Finance, 49:1213-1252, 1994.
[10] D. Mauer and S. Sarkar. Real options, agency conflicts, and optimal capital structure.
Joumal of Banking and Finance, 29: 1405-1428, 2005.
[11] R. McDonald and D. Siegel. The value of waiting to invest. Quarterly Joumal of Economics,
101:707-727, 1986.
[12] F. Modigliani and M. Miller. The cost of capital, corporatlon finance and the theory of
investment. American Economic Review, 48:261-297, 1958.
[13] P. Murto. Exit in duopoly under uncertalnty. RAND Joumal of Economics, 35:111-127,
2004.
[14] M. Nishihara and M. Fukushima. Evaluation of firm’s loss due to incomplete information
in real investment decision. European Journal of Operational Research, 188:569-585, 2008.
218
[15] M. Nishihara and A. Ohyama. R&D competition in alternative technologies: A real options
approach. Joumal of the Operations Research Society of Japan, 51: forthcoming, 2008.
[16] M. Nishihara and T. Shibata. The agency problem between the owner and the manager in
real investment: The bonus-audit relationship. Operations Research Letters, forthcoming.
[17] S. Sundaresan and N. Wang. Investment under uncertainty and strategic debt service.
American Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings, 97:256-261.
[18] S. Sundaresan and N. Wang. Dynamic investment, capital structure, and debt overhang.
Working Paper, Columbia University, 2007.
[19] H. Weeds. Strategic delay in a real options model of R&D competition. Review of Economic
Studies, 69:729-747, 2002.
219
